The next stage of de-escalation in eastern Ladakh to guarantee that the agreement remains durable will be more difficult and may require extended and patient negotiation by India and China.
By Maj Gen Sudhakar Jee, VSM (Retd)
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had amassed a large number of troops and armaments in eastern Ladakh and other areas along the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) in April-May, 2020. The PLA moved into the Indian territory and built fortified structures and defenses, in an attempt to permanently alter the ‘status quo’ on the ground contrary to the Protocols and Agreements signed in 1993,1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 between two neighbors with nuclear power destroying the Peace and Tranquility along the border holding out for preceding four odd decades.
The clashes that erupted on the north bank of Pangong Tso on May 5, 2020 in which 70 Indian soldiers were injured was triggered by the PLA ingress blocking the routine Indian Army patrol to Finger 8 followed by at Naku La in north Sikkim on May 9, 2020. This compelled India to respond by mobilizing additional troops and equipment to match the Chinese build up. The clash at Galwan on June 15, 2020 resulting in loss of lives of 20 Indian soldiers and over 45 PLA, though only four lives of PLA soldiers claimed to have been lost by China, was followed by yet another clash on December 9, 2022, when the Indian Army prevented the PLA from transgressing into Indian territory resulting in injuries.
The disengagement process at five friction points was completed in September 2022. The latest agreement announced on October 21, 2024, by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri that was reached with China on "patrolling arrangement” along the LAC leading to "disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020” brings hope of restoration of stability including removal of the buffer zones and resumption of patrolling as was undertaken prior to April 2020 post disengagement in Depsang and Demchok areas that were considered complex and tricky.
There are two immediate benefits from the months-long negotiation that led to the agreement. First, political re-engagement has commenced with PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping meeting in Kazan as there has been no meeting between the top leaders of the two nuclear-armed states for the past five years, and the resumption of the Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor-level dialogues.
Second, it ends the five-year crisis by bringing the resolution of the standoffs at Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh, thus stabilizing the border region. In addition, the same also is hoped to restore the access of the Indian Army patrols to their Patrolling Points (PPs)1 to 65 from Karakoram Pass to Chumar in eastern Ladakh extending over a distance of 832 kms in High/Super High Altitude Areas. These PPs, in vogue since 1996, based on the China Study Group guidelines, largely located on the limits of patrolling depicting the benchmark locations mutually agreed to by both India and China, are to be patrolled regularly by the Indian Security Forces (ISF).
According to one of the research papers submitted at the police conference in January 2023, out of 65 PPs, India’s presence reportedly had lost in 26 PPs due to restrictive or no patrolling by the ISFs. Later China, by process of “Salami Slicing”, to grab land inch by inch forcing India to accept the fact that as such areas did not have the presence of ISFs or civilians since long, the presence of Chinese in these areas entitled the same to the latter leading to shifting of border under control of ISFs towards Indian side.
The same thus resulted in creating a buffer zone in all such pockets leading to loss of control over these areas by India thereby denying grazing rights for herders. The traditional grazing grounds have served as pastures of the semi-nomadic community of Changthang region (Rebos) and given the scarcity of the rich pastures, they would traditionally venture into the areas close to the PPs. As there has been enhanced restrictions on the grazing movement and areas imposed on the Rebos by the ISFs, the same has caused resentment amongst them. The issue of grazing grounds has been a major friction point between India and China and the latest agreement addresses that in the Demchok area.
The next stage of de-escalation in eastern Ladakh to guarantee that the agreement remains durable will be more difficult and may require extended and patient negotiation by two sides. As trust is in short supply, neither side will dilute its military presence unless there is confidence that the other side will not exploit the situation to their respective advantage.
The “mobilization differential” of PLA being faster than ISFs owing to former’s better connectivity being on a flat terrain to forward locations as against long distances and adverse terrain friction in the Indian side of the border, the GOI should consider keeping the location of own troops close to point of actions which would provide equal if not better response matrix to critical situations. The underlying concept of response of ISF should be driven by proactive response based on effective Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to avoid being surprised in future.
Using the current thaw as a trigger, India should consider establishing permanent structures incrementally and locate ISF along all the 65 PPs so that China's ‘Salami Slicing” can be addressed and stabilize the border for a permanent resolution of the border dispute. The defense budget that has been declining from approximately 16.4 per cent in 2012-13 to 12.9 per cent in 2024-25 of Annual Central Government Expenditure must be increased as continued investment in the military will enhance India’s Defence capability, urgently required along the borders.
Overall, the rebuilding of trust with China will require China working on the same. The Government of India would do well to be cautious, "trust but verify” and “continue building deterrence” as both are necessary for national security.
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(The writer is a former Colonel of the Mahar Regiment who served in the Indian Army for over 37 years.)
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The views expressed are not necessarily those of The South Asian Times
