India needs to change its current strategy toward Bangladesh because the country has become assertive and independent. The cautious reset currently underway is neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown.
By Vipul Tamhane
After fifteen years of managed alignment, the ousting of Sheikh Hasina has forced India and Bangladesh into a reckoning, one that will define the strategic contours of South Asia for decades to come. The diplomatic temperature between India and Bangladesh is rising, slowly, carefully, and with deliberate restraint.
The New Delhi and Dhaka governments use silent diplomatic efforts to establish trust between their nations while they work through the political crisis that followed Sheikh Hasina's removal. The recent "goodwill" outreach by aides of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman signals that both capitals understand a fundamental truth: neither nation can afford to stop their diplomatic relations because of their strategic interests and geographical ties.
This analysis extends the argument made in our earlier piece, which traced the arc from the Hasina era's managed stability through the shock of her August 2024 removal and into the cautious reset of 2026. Where that article examined the structural fault lines and security imperatives shaping the bilateral relationship, this companion piece zooms out to the wider frame: the role of Washington's quiet hand in stabilizing regional incentives, China's expanding footprint as a variable neither side can ignore, and the fundamental question of whether strategic compulsion alone can sustain a partnership that has lost its political anchor.
The reset is underway. Whether it hardens into architecture or dissolves into managed rivalry is the defining regional security question of the moment. The student protests, which occurred in August 2024, brought down Sheikh Hasina, who had ruled for fifteen years, and their effects spread beyond Dhaka. New Delhi experienced more than just diplomatic problems after the events that followed.
India had invested heavily through its political and economic efforts and its international standing to support the Awami League. With Hasina's abrupt flight to Indian soil, that investment became a liability almost overnight.
The relationship now stands at an inflection point. Following the Bangladesh Nationalist Party's landslide victory in the February 2026 parliamentary elections and the assumption of power by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, both nations are engaged in what can best be described as a cautious reset, one defined less by warmth than by the cold arithmetic of strategic necessity.
The geographical boundaries of both countries make it impossible for either country to choose to withdraw from their treaty obligations. Bangladesh is situated so that it exists as an Indian territory except for its northeastern states, which need to access land through Bangladesh.
The Hasina era established the strongest phase of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Dhaka and New Delhi established their maritime boundary
through a 2014 agreement which also included a 2015 land boundary treaty and multiple cross-border passenger rail connections and the Maitri Setu bridge and energy trade corridors.
The yearly trade between the two countries reached more than $18 billion. Hasina's government successfully removed all safe locations used by anti-Indian insurgent groups, which included ULFA and northeastern groups that had been operating from Bangladeshi soil. For New Delhi, this was not a diplomatic achievement. It was a strategic windfall.
That era is over. The question is what replaces it. The foreign policy doctrine of Prime Minister Rahman becomes clear through his four basic words, which state that countries should be treated as friends but not as masters.
The younger Bangladesh, which maintains its rights to fairness and mutual respect with India, operates through a process of reevaluation rather than showing hostility. The statement establishes a position of national authority instead of creating an atmosphere of conflict.
The newly established political system between Bangladesh and India created fresh diplomatic regulations that both nations must follow to conduct their
official interactions.
The April 2026 visit of Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman to New Delhi, the first such high-level exchange since the political transition, offered cautious encouragement. The two officials who met with each other reached an agreement to keep their contact regular.
The visit was described, deliberately, as a "goodwill mission". The two parties both recognize that they must develop trust through time-consuming processes instead of through public displays of their relationship.
The goodwill mission fails to solve the fundamental issues that exist between the two parties that maintain friendly diplomatic relations. The most explosive element of this situation centers on the issue of border-related killings.
The 4,096-kilometre border area, which contains a heavy military presence, continues to experience ongoing suffering because Indian Border Security Force personnel kill Bangladeshi civilians at rates that create widespread anger in Dhaka and give anti-India politicians tools to attack their opponents.
The Rahman government needs to prove its Bangladesh First policy, which it developed for international relations purposes, to the world, because the policy exists as an essential test for the Indian government.
Diplomatic relations between India and Bangladesh will never reach higher levels of trust because Sheikh Hasina maintains her presence in India. The Teesta River water-sharing dispute remains unresolved at this time, which has created a permanent state of conflict between the two countries for more than ten years.
Bangladesh requires Teesta water for its agricultural operations, which makes the Indian government sharing agreement with Bangladesh impossible to complete because of West Bengal's domestic politics, which creates a power imbalance that Bangladesh finds most intolerable.
The diplomatic discussions between the two nations face an obstacle because of the presence of Sheikh Hasina and her convicted associates, who remain on Indian soil. The new government in Dhaka finds her Indian sanctuary to be both an inconvenience and a political provocation that creates a trust barrier.
The security situation in India has been deteriorating since the start of each month. The political space that was emptied after the Awami League's downfall now gets occupied by New Delhi's suspicious forces, which include the return of Islamist groups and the political comeback of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Pakistani military establishment's diplomatic efforts.
People continue to debate whether the developments represent a strategic transformation or the typical disturbances that occur during post-authoritarian transitions. Indian intelligence agencies perceive the northeastern security situation to be moving toward a worse condition.
The broader regional stakes have equal importance, which extends beyond their immediate impact. China has been continuously expanding its presence in Bangladesh through its investment in infrastructure projects and establishment of strategic partnerships.
The stable India-Bangladesh relationship enables Dhaka to maintain its strategic independence from Beijing because the relationship creates a diplomatic space that China has historically used to establish control. New Delhi recognizes this situation, although it expresses its acknowledgment through difficulty speaking.
And yet the case for engagement remains overwhelming. India considers Bangladesh as its main South Asian trading partner, while Bangladesh serves as an important geographic location that India needs for its northeastern operations. The distance from Kolkata to Agartala through Bangladesh is roughly 350 kilometres; the same journey through India's own narrow Siliguri Corridor stretches to over 1,600 kilometres.
The cartographic reality remains unchanged despite political conflicts. Geography ensures that neither country can simply opt out. Bangladesh is almost entirely India-locked. India's northeastern states remain hostage to geography. Both nations are, in the most literal sense, condemned to cooperation.
The question, then, is whether both leaderships possess the political maturity to convert strategic compulsion into genuine partnership. The Rahman government's insistence on equity is not unreasonable, it is, in fact, a more sustainable foundation for long-term relations than the patron-client dynamic that characterised the Hasina years.
The relationship between two people who respect each other will last longer than any bond created through shared political beliefs. India needs to acknowledge this fact about relationships.
The upcoming months require the execution of specific objectives which need to be completed through actual achievements. The first goal requires the tracking of border-related fatalities. The second goal needs to establish real progress on Teesta.
The third goal needs to develop a diplomatic approach that enables both governments to progress on the Hasina issue. Bangladesh needs to provide its security guarantees through actual proof which shows that its territory will not be used as a base for insurgents who target India's Northeast region.
The path to stability runs not through nostalgia for the Hasina era, but through the harder work of building a relationship which suits the requirements of contemporary society. The median age of Bangladesh is approximately 27. The upcoming generation does not remember 1971 and they do not carry any responsibility for India's contributions to the liberation movement yet they expect their partnership with India to provide them actual economic benefits instead of mere diplomatic representation.
India needs to change its current strategy toward Bangladesh because the country has become assertive and independent. The cautious reset currently underway is neither a breakthrough nor a breakdown. The situation exists as a managed holding pattern because both parties recognize that the previous balance of power has ended, and they currently lack a new balance of power.
India needs to develop beyond its current friendship with one partner while Bangladesh must prove its ability to maintain both strategic independence and regional security.
The architecture of a durable partnership is possible. But it will not be assembled through goodwill alone. The process needs both parties to make difficult negotiations while showing political bravery and treating each other with equal respect.
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(Vipul Tamhane is a counter-terrorism expert and governance consultant)
The views expressed are not necessarily those of The South Asian Times
