By Manoj Kumar Mishra
While the impacts of the war in the Middle East between Iran on the one hand and the US and Israel on the other were felt around the globe, the repercussions were most immediate and acute for Afghanistan, which shares a 921-kilometer-long border with Iran.
Afghanistan’s proximity to the conflict zone as well as its landlocked geography carried grave risks from economic and security perspectives. For decades, Afghanistan had been confronting war from within. However, since the Taliban assumed power in 2021, the country has transitioned from relentless insurgency to a period of centralized rule by the Taliban.
Nonetheless, years of insurgency have not only prevented Afghanistan from improving its socioeconomic structures, it has sapped the country's domestic resources as well. Moreover, the current regime faces international isolation- no country has extended formal recognition to it except Russia. While this factor has impeded Afghanistan’s economic rejuvenation, inadequate domestic support structures and overdependence on the land route provided by Pakistan for trade also contributed to its rickety economy.
Pakistan’s border clashes with Afghanistan and the closure of the land route made the regime even more dependent on Iran, while Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Iran for essential imports, including medicines, food, oil, and gas. As a result, the war in the Middle East, if protracted, could disrupt this trade, posing immediate risks to food security, and at worst, it could lead to a humanitarian crisis.
Substituting Iran as Afghanistan’s primary trading partner would entail significant time and financial costs. Although imports are sourced from Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia, Iran’s geographic proximity and stable overland routes render it uniquely critical to Afghanistan’s supply chains.
Further, since October 2025, the land corridor between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been closed, through which a major chunk of Afghan trade is routed. This closure has suspended both commercial trade and the movement of Afghan migrant workers to Pakistan, cutting off a critical source of remittances for Afghanistan.
In response, the Taliban has increasingly looked to Iran, the only other large adjacent state. Iran’s markets, like Pakistan’s, are capable of absorbing Afghan goods and employing Afghan migrant labor whose remittances support families at home. Crucially, the overland route through Iran to its seaports represents the most geographically feasible alternative to Pakistan’s road network and the port of Karachi. Consequently, a significant portion of Afghanistan’s non-Pakistani trade was redirected through Iran to the port of Chabahar.
Iran emerged as Afghanistan’s principal trading partner in 2025, displacing Pakistan, with bilateral trade totalling $3.5 billion. Chabahar, which is managed by India, is Iran’s easternmost seaport and lies outside the Strait of Hormuz. Its geographic position makes it a direct alternative to Karachi for Afghanistan’s access to international markets. Recognizing its strategic value, the Taliban government — despite severe fiscal constraints — invested $35 million in the port in 2024.
Economic and security concerns
The outbreak of war has severely disrupted this corridor. Since February, logistics between Afghanistan and Chabahar have become untenable. Overland transport must traverse Iran amid US and Israeli airstrikes, while vessels departing Chabahar navigate an active conflict zone under a US naval blockade.
Adding insult to the injury, the US sanctions waiver enabling India’s development and operation of Iran’s Chabahar Port, in place since 2018, expired on April 26 this year. While this is unlikely to compel India’s exit from the project, it will impose significant constraints on its expansion.
Exacerbating the situation, Afghan migrant workers in Iran are returning home in large numbers to escape the conflict. Given that millions of Afghans reside in Iran, with over 1,700 repatriating daily, this influx is placing significant additional strain on Afghanistan’s economy.
The simultaneous decline in trade and surge in population is driving sharp increases in demand for essential goods amid acute supply disruptions. Fuel costs have also risen substantially due to elevated oil prices linked to the war. As a result, inflationary pressures are mounting.
Unemployment, already a pervasive challenge, is expected to worsen considerably with the return of migrant labour. If economic instability has been Afghanistan’s baseline, current conditions risk escalating the crisis to unprecedented levels. Whenever Iran faced external pressures from the US and Israel, it resorted to the deportation of Afghans.
Last year, in June, amid the 12-day clashes with Israel and the US, Iran deported Afghan migrants on the grounds of security concerns and economic crisis. Large numbers were detained and repatriated. Refugee facilities in Iran, including the Tembako Pass camp, faced crisis conditions, with thousands
awaiting deportation.
The rapid influx of returnees, compounded by parallel deportations from Pakistan, is expected to generate significant security and economic repercussions. Analysts caution that, in the absence of adequate support and infrastructure, extremist organizations such as ISKP and Al-Qaeda may exploit vulnerable migrant populations.
A grim concern is the potential relocation of Al-Qaeda members and other radical groups aligned with Iran and the Taliban into Afghanistan. Various reports indicate that Al-Qaeda actively encourages its adherents to settle in Afghanistan, where they may receive protection from the Taliban.
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[Dr Manoj Kumar Mishra is a senior lecturer of Political Science at SVM Autonomous College in Jagatsinghpur, Odisha, India]
The views expressed are not necessarily those of The South Asian Times
